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FAIR REPRESENTATION: MEETING THE !DEAL OF ONE MAN, ONE 
VoTE. By Michel L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press. 1982. Pp. xi, 191. $27.50. 
The United States Constitution provides that congressional rep-
resentatives should be distributed among the states in proportion to 
each states' share of the national population, with each state receiv-
ing at least one representative. 1 This provision embodies a basic 
ideal of democracy - that each citizen's vote should be worth as 
much as another's.2 A state's fair share of representatives rarely will 
be a whole number, so Congress must decide how to treat the frac-
tional components whenever it reapportions congressional seats 
based on new census data. This decision affects the distribution of 
only a few seats in Congress and the electoral college,3 but in closely 
contested matters, such as the presidential election of 1876, those few 
seats may mean the difference between victory and defeat.4 
In Fair Representation, Michel L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young 
chronicle the apportionment debates that have recurred in Congress 
since the early days of the republic. Drawing lessons from history 
and mathematics, the authors provide an insightful analysis of the 
various apportionment methods that have been proposed, and they 
conclude that Daniel Webster's method, which Congress discarded 
in 1941, is the fairest. Although the analysis rests ultimately on com-
plex mathematical proofs, which are presented in a lengthy appen-
dix, the authors' textual argument is based on simple arithmetic and 
empirical data that are readily accessible to the layperson. 
The first congressional apportionment debate took place in 
1791,5 pitting the "Jeffersonian Republicans against the Federalist 
forces led by Hamilton" (p. 10). Following a House-Senate dead-
lock, Congress initially passed an apportionment bill employing a 
method that Alexander Hamilton devised. Hamilton's method as-
I. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
2. "[T]he co=and of Art. I, § 2 ... means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote 
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 
U.S. I, 7-8 (1964) (footnote omitted). 
3. The number of presidential electors from each state is "equal to the whole Number of 
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress •.•• " U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 2. 
4. In the election of 1876, Rutherford B. Hayes was elected president over Samuel J. 
Tilden by a vote of 185 to 184 in the electoral college, even though Tilden received a majority 
of the popular vote. See 2 BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STA-
TISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 78, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1073 (1975). A differ-
ent method of apportionment would have tipped the balance in favor of Tilden. See text 
following note 15 infra. 
5. The Constitution provided the initial allotment of representatives to each state, pending 
the outcome of the first census. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
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signs each state its "quota" or fair share of seats based on its percent-
age of the national population.6 Most seats are allocated by giving 
each state the whole number portion of its quota. Thus, a state with 
a quota of 19 2/3 would receive at least 19 representatives. The re-
maining seats are then distributed to the states with the largest left-
over fractions. If four seats remained to be apportioned, the four 
states with the largest fractions would each receive an additional seat 
(pp. 13-17).7 
At the urging of Thomas Jefferson and others, President Wash-
ington vetoed the Hamiltonian apportionment bill and later signed a 
bill employing a method that Jefferson conceived. Jefferson's method 
distributes all seats based on a calculation that permits fractions to 
be disregarded. The method divides the population of each state by 
a common divisor, which represents a hypothetical constituency size 
(e.g., 30,000 people per representative). It then gives each state the 
number of representatives equal to the whole number portion of the 
quotient that the division produces. Thus, if a state has a population 
of 107,000 and the divisor is 10,000, the former is divided by the 
latter, producing a quotient of 10.7, and the state receives ten repre-
sentatives. Any number may be chosen as a divisor as long as it 
produces a set of state quotients whose whole numbers add up to the 
total number of seats to be apportioned (pp. 18-19).8 
Congress employed Jefferson's method in succeeding decades, 
but experience began to show that the method was systematically 
biased in favor of the larger states (p. 23). In the five censuses from 
1790 to 1830, Delaware, which was the smallest state, had a total fair 
share of 8.54 seats, but received only six. New York, which was 
among the population leaders, received 128 seats with a total fair 
share of only 123.58 (p. 23).9 The method's bias is easily explained. 
Dropping fractions effects a much greater loss of representation in 
the small states than in the large. For example, a state with a quo-
tient of 1.5 realizes a thirty-three percent loss when the fraction is 
6. A state's quota "is found by dividing the state's population by the total population [of 
the nation] and then multiplying by the total number of representatives to be apportioned." P. 
14. 
7. At this point, it is natural to ask: why not simply allot to each state its quota rounded 
oft? The answer is that simply rounding 
does not necessarily give a result that sums to the required number of seats. For example, 
if there are too many fractions that are less than .5 then simple rounding will result in too 
few seats, whereas if too many fractions are above .5 then simple rounding will give out 
too many seats. 
P. 17. 
8. For example, any divisor between 28,356 and 28,511 would have worked under the 1791 
census with a House size of 120. P. 19 n.•. 
9. The authors derive a state's total fair share by adding its quotas for each of the five 
censuses in question. See p. 23. 
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dropped, while a state with a quotient of 10.5 loses less than five 
percent (p. 13). 
During the 1820's and 1830's, opponents of Jefferson's method 
proposed alternative methods in an effort to cure the prevailing large 
state bias (pp. 23-33). The most noteworthy alternative sprang from 
the mind of Daniel Webster during the 1832 apportionment de-
bate.10 Webster's method, like Jefferson's, divides the population of 
each state by a common divisor. However, unlike Jefferson's 
method, it then rounds off the resulting quotient to the nearest whole 
number and gives the state that number of representatives. 11 Thus, 
if the division produces a quotient of 10.7, the state receives 11 repre-
sentatives (pp. 30-33). Although the large states are advantaged 
whenever a quotient is rounded down, 12 the small states realize a 
disproportionate gain whenever a quotient is rounded up.13 "Since 
the Webster method rounds fractions above one-half up and below 
one-half down, each state will be advantaged or disadvantaged the 
same number of times on average" (p. 76). 
Congress abandoned Jefferson's method in favor of Webster's, 
following the 1840 census (pp. 34-35). However, Webster's method 
remained in use for only a decade. In 1850, Congress adopted Ham-
ilton's method as part of a "permanent" apportionment act. Al-
though the act was on the books for more than fifty years, it was 
never strictly observed. The act specified a fixed House size of 233, 
but Congress always allocated more than that number of seats. 14 In 
the 1860's and 1870's, Congress parcelled out a small number of 
seats based on purely political considerations and without regard for 
Hamilton's method. 15 If Hamilton's method had been followed, 
Rutherford B. Hayes' one vote margin of victory in the electoral col-
10. Congress also considered, but failed to adopt, three other proposals during this period, 
A representative named William Lowndes suggested a variation on Hamilton's method, while 
John Quincy Adams and a professor named James Dean suggested variations on Jefferson's 
method. Pp. 23-30. 
11. Where Jefferson's method employs a divisor that produces a set of quotients that sum 
to the required total when all fractions are dropped,see text accompanying note 8supra, Web-
ster's method uses a divisor producing quotients that sum to the desired total when all fractions 
are rounded off. See p. 32. 
12. See text following note 9 supra. 
13. For example, a state with a quotient of 1.6 realizes a 25 percent gain in representation 
when the quotient is rounded to 2. However, a state with a quotient of 10.6 gains less than 4 
percent under the same rounding process. 
14. While the act was in effect, House sizes ranged from a low of234 during the 1850's to a 
high of 356 during the 1890's. See App. B, pp. 161-66. 
15. In the 1860s, 233 seats were first meted out in accordance with the [Hamilton] 
method, and then a pretext was found to give out 8 more seats - all of them to Northern 
states. A similar process was resorted to in the 1870s .... A first apportionment of 283 
seats . . . was supplemented by 9 additional seats several months later, and this definitive 
apportionment agreed with neither a Hamilton nor a Webster apportionment of292 seats. 
P. 37 (footnote omitted). 
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lege in 1876 would have been reversed, and Samuel J. Tilden would 
have been elected President (p. 37). 
In 1881, Congress discovered a flaw in Hamilton's method that 
eventually caused its repeal. Under the 1880 census, Hamilton's 
method gave Alabama eight seats in a House of 299, but only seven 
seats in a House of 300. In a letter to Congress, the chief clerk of the 
Census Office pointed out the so-called "Alabama Paradox" and 
urged the adoption of a different method. Congress responded by 
choosing a House size that produced the same results under Web-
ster's and Hamilton's methods. This compromise survived the 1890 
census, but died in 1901, when Congress deliberately chose Web-
ster's method over Hamilton's (pp. 38-42). 
Following the 1910 census, Congress again used Webster's 
method of apportionment, but a new method surfaced during the 
debate. Joseph A. Hill, a statistician with the Bureau of the Census, 
offered a proposal that distributed seats in such a way that no trans-
fer of any one seat could reduce the percentage disparity in constitu-
ency size between the affected states (pp. 47-48). In practice, Hill's 
method is simply another variation of the divisor concept employed 
in Jefferson's and Webster's methods. Hill's method gives each state 
"either its quotient rounded up or rounded down, depending on 
whether or not the quotient exceeds the 'geometric mean' of these 
two choices" (p. 62). The geometric mean is calculated by multiply-
ing the two numbers and finding the square root of their product. 
Thus, a quotient of 1.45 would entitle a state to 2 seats, because 1.45 
is greater than the geometric mean of 1 and 2, which is approxi-
mately 1.41. 
Hill's method eventually replaced Webster's. In the face of rising 
urban populations, congressmen from agricultural states sought to 
minimize "the inevitable erosion in their power'' (p. 51), and Hill's 
method helped them to do so. Because the geometric mean always 
falls less than half way between two numbers (pp. 62-63), Hill's 
method rounds quotients up more often than it rounds down, and 
rounding up favors smaller states. 16 Congress failed to pass an ap-
portionment plan following the 1920 census, and it avoided dispute a 
decade later because Webster's and Hill's methods happened to pro-
duce the same distribution of seats. However, under the 1940 census, 
Webster's method allocated a seat to Michigan that Hill's method 
gave to Arkansas. Since Arkansas was safely Democratic, the Dem-
ocratic Congress opted for Hill's method, which came to be used in 
each succeeding apportionment through the present (pp. 51-59). 
From their review of the apportionment debates, Balinski and 
Young derive a set of principles for judging the fairness of the vari-
16. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
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ous apportionment methods. First, the authors contend that no 
method is fair which suffers from the "Alabama Paradox" or related 
paradoxes that they discuss (p. 68). Second, they suggest that the 
method should be as free as possible from any systematic bias in 
favor oflarge or small states (p. 71). Third, the method should mini-
mize the possibility that a given state will receive more than its quota 
rounded up or less than its quota rounded down (p. 79). 
Although no method can conform perfectly to the authors' prin-
ciples (p. 81),17 Webster's method comes closest. Webster's method 
and the other divisor methods completely avoid the paradoxes inher-
ent in the Hamiltonian scheme (pp. 67-70). But unlike other divisor 
methods, Webster's method is free of systematic bias (pp. 76-77). 
And of all divisor methods, Webster's is least likely to deviate unac-
ceptably from quota. Under present conditions, Webster's method 
would violate quota approximately once in every 1,600 apportion-
ments, or once in every 16,000 years (p. 81).18 
Fair Representation is a significant book. The authors lucidly dis-
sect a complex issue that has plagued Congress for almost 200 years, 
and they offer a solution that is both intuitively appealing and math-
ematically sound. The current method of apportionment, as Fair 
Representation demonstrates, is not the fairest. Congress would do 
well to take note. 19 
17. The authors offer a so-called "impossibility theorem" to prove this point mathemati-
cally. App. A, pp. 129-34. 
18. Although Hamilton's method does not violate quota, it produces the paradox problem 
much more often (approximately once in every 18 apportionments) than Webster's method 
violates quota. P. 82. 
19. Following the 1980 census, Representative Fithian introduced a bill that would have 
changed the method of apportionments. See H.R. 1990, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). How-
ever, the bill employed Hamilton's method rather than Webster's, and Peyton Young, one of 
the authors of Fair Representation, warned the co=ittee considering the bill about problems 
such as the Alabama Paradox. See Hearings on Census Activities and the Decennial Census 
Before the Suhcomm. on Census and Population of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil 
Service, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-43 (1981). No action was taken on the bill. 
